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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
MARVIN YOUNG and
STELLA YOUNG, his wife,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

Case No.

vs.
1

10774

GEORGE BRIDWELL,
Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The appellants brought an action against the
respondent for breach of contract and negligence in
the handling of a case for the appellants, and now
appeal from a judgment dismissing their complaint
in the District Court of the Third Judicial District.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The District Court for Salt Lake County heard
argument of counsel for both the appellants and re~1mnden t and then ruled as a matter of law that
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plaintiffs' complaint should be dismissed, no cause
of action.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellants seek reversal of the District
Court judgment as it relates to matters of law and
for remand of the case for trial by a jury.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Originally, the respondent in this matter was
retained by the appellants for the purpose of pursuing an action in the District Court of Salt LakP
County, upon the Complaint which is marked "Exhibit B", attached to Plaintiffs' -Appellants' Complaint which is a part of the record on file in this
action. It is basically because of Respondent's breach
of his fiduciary contractual duty to the appellants
and his negligence in the handling of the case above i
mentioned that gave rise to the present controversy.
Respondents' wrongful conduct of which Appellants complained is specifically set out in detail in
Plaintiffs'-Appellants' Complaint in a series of five
( 5) alternative causes of action, and the Appellants
rely upon the Complaint to fully set forth an accurate ,
statement of facts as it relates to this matter.
Specifically, however, Appellants assert
that the Respondent breached his contract and was
negligent because of his: (1) inattention to the case
in having Alan D. Frandsen try the case when he was
not sufficiently acquainted with the case, and, there·
fore, allowing the Judge to err in certain specific
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orders, (a) the Court's pretrial order, which is attached as "Exhibit A" to Plaintiffs' -Appellants'
Complaint in holding as a matter of law that acceptance of payment amounted to renewal of the lease,
and (b) entry of its findings of fact, wherein it
stated that the Lease had been extended for a period
of five ( 5) years, because of the acceptance of rental
payments. ( 2) Failing to notify Plaintiffs-Appellants of their Rights of Appeal and the time in
which they could appeal.
Because the Court decided that the results would
not have been different on appeal in the original
case it dismissed the present case now before the
Court and from such decision relief is sought.

i

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS PRE-TRIAL
ORDER IN ELIMINATING AS AN ISSUE; IS
THE HIRING OF ANOTHER ATTORNEY WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE CLIENT ACTIONABLE AS A BREACH OF CONTRACT?
In its pre-trial order the Court discussed whether it was an act of negligence on the part of the Respondent to hire another attorney without the consent
of the client and in so doing stated:
"The Court finds no negligence that can be
prove d ... "
and further:
" ... the conduct of the Defendant in employing Mr. Frandsen would only be material
in that it caused another attorney to be at the
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trial, and possibly Mr. Bridwell was not fully
informed as to the Court's action at the Pretrial and the Trial, in giving the Plaintiff the
advice that Plaintiff claims she received."
(Page 3, Pre-trial Order.)
In making the above order the pre-trial Court
completely overlooked the appellants contention that
the hiring of another attorney without their consent
amounted to a breach of contract.
The Court may have been correct in ruling as a
matter of law that such conduct was not actionable
when founded upon negligence but the Court erred
when it eliminated this issue as it relates to breach
of contract.
The Appellants contend that they hired the Respondent to perform certain legal services for them
and that, without their consent, the Respondent
hired another attorney to represent them. The Appellants further assert that they were not aware of
this fact until the day of the trial when they were
met by Mr. Frandsen at the Court room shortly before trial time. (Marvin C. Young Deposition, page
15, lines 19-21.) At this time apparently even Mr.
Frandsen was uncertain that he would be trying the
case because he was still expecting the Respondent
to appear at the trial. (Marvin C. Young Deposition,
page 17, lines 20-26, and Alan D. Frandsen Deposition, page 22, lines 9-12).
When a person is retained for the purpose of
performing some personal service, as the respondent
was,(Marvin C. Young Deposition, page 10, lin~s
1-17) to hire someone else to perform the services is
clearly a breach of contract. Meyer v. Washington
Times Co., (1935) 64 App D. C. 218, 76 F 2d 988.
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The Court should not have eliminated this matter at pre-trial under the single theory of negligence,
but should have allowed as an issue for trial, the
question of breach of contract.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT
THE RESULTS WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT ON APPEAL IN THE ORIGINAL CASE
AND THEREFORE AN APPEAL WOULD HAVE
BEEN OF NO AVAIL.
It is the general rule of law with which the
appellants have no argument, that to hold an attorney liable for negligence in not advising a client of
his rights of appeal, you must prove that if the appeal
or new trial had been obtained, a judgment more
favorable to the Plaintiff, would have resulted. There
are numerous cases in connection with this matter,
and they are annotated in 45 ALR 2d 55, also cited
in 7 Am Jur. 2d, 149 Attorney section 172. Therefore, it is the obligation of the Appellants to first
prove that the results of the appeal would have been
favorable to them, thus reversing the trial Court's
decision. The Appellants will therefore address their
remarks to the law relating to leases and lease renewal which was the subject of the original case and
is the subject matter which is claimed to have been
ruled in err upon by the trial Court in the original
case which Respondent was hired to litigate. It is
upon this legal concept that the Appellants claim the
results would have been different had Respondent
advised Appellants of their right of Appeal and had
an appeal been taken.
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Generally, it is held that where a Lessee, having
a general privilege of extending the Lease, holds
over even without any notice to the Lessor of his
election to extend the Lease for the further term
his holding over constitutes an election so as to extend'
and he is entitled as against the Lessor to hold for
a further term. This is the general rule of law as set
forth in 64 ALR 316n., with numerous annotations
supporting this proposition, with which general
proposition the Appellants find no fault, however,
as is the case with all general rules, there are numerous exceptions, and it is to one of these exceptions
that the Appellants claim a contrary rule. In the
case of Carhart vs. White Mantel & Tile Company,
(1909) 122 Tenn. 455, 123 S. W. 747, wherein it
was held:
"The mere continuance of occupancy by
the tenant or lessee after the expiration of the
lease period is ordinarily accepted as the exercise of the option reserved in the lease to
occupy the premises for an additional term .
.h . .,/,6/ ·-.r:;~ ":,,-j This is the presumption that ordinarily arises
rzcV?t , "/.-A'rc~~:~from Aygyst 10, lQ(:)g to J ..ugust 10, 1Qe7, eR
faf~~~{/ ( /;v not conclusive of the ~e~see's intention to accept
J. -c;:, J
·<t .. £ .. <'.'.
the lease for an add1t10nal term. If the lease,
'
.
as in this case, provides for an additional term
at an increased rental, and after the expiration of the lease period the tenant holds over
and pays the increased rental, this is affir!11ative evidence on his part that he has exercised
the option to take the lease for an additional
term; but where, under a lease like the present,
the tenant holds over after the expiration .of
the original term, and does not pay the increased rental as provided by the lease, bi~t
continues to pay the original rental, which is
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accepted by the lessor, this negatives the idea
of the acceptance of the privilege of an additional term. Under such circumstances, the
lessee holding over will occupy the status of a
tenant at will." (Emphasis added.)
It would thus appear, that the Court below in the
original case erred in two ways, First, in holding as
a matter of law, that the tender of rent at the same
amount, constituted a renewal because the option
agreement in our present lease provides:

"The lessees shall have the option to extend said lease for an additional five ( 5) years
from August 10, 1962 to August 10, 1967, on
the same terms and conditions as the original
lease, except the rental payment thereof."
(Emphasis added.)
Therefore, the lease in the present case, like the
Tennessee case, provided for a new term on the same
terms, except as to payment, and therefore, a tender
of payment in an amount the same as due under
the prior lease did not renew the lease for a like
amount, but created only a tenancy at will. Second,
the Court erred in making a finding in this matter,
as a matter of law. As the Tennessee case also points
out, this is a factual matter only, and evidence should
have been introduced relating to this matter, since
there may have been circumstances which would have
rebutted the acceptance of payments for a like
amount as being acceptance of the renewal of the
term for a like term and like amount. The Court
should have looked at the circumstances and dealt
with the facts specifically in this case, rather than
attempting to apply a general rule of law.
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In the case of Alan v. Alan ( 1922) 154 Ga. 581,
115 SE 17, the Court held that a landlord, by accepting rent from a holding over tenant for the period
for which the landlord has prosecuted a Summary
Proceeding to Eject the Tenant does not thereby consent to a continuation of the tenancy. These facts
are extremely similar to the case at hand, in that,
the Appellants herein werM~~ecuting an action
for ejectment and for ~S~llOR of the lease at the
time the payments in question were accepted, again
the Court erred in ruling as a matter of law, that
acceptance of the payment renewed the lease for a
like term, and for a like sum, because to do so was
contrary to the terms of the lease and because the
law does not substantiate this ruling. Evidence
should have been admitted to show the circumstances
and explain the reason for acceptance.
The appellants would call the Court's attention
to the case of Colyear v. Tobriner, et al. (1.936) 62
P. 2d 741, a California Supreme Court Case. In this
case, it is clearly established that when a party is
leasing premises for a specified amount each month,
and the lease contains an option for an increased
rental payment for the renewal period, payment of
the previously existing rental is not sufficient to
establish a renewal for a like amount during the
extended term. The intent of the parties must be
determined, and therefore, it becomes a factual matter and not one of law, thus necessitating a trial
of the case upon its merits rather than a determina·
tion being made as a matter of law. See also 32
Am Jur. 827 Landlord and Tenant Section 983,
wherein it is stated:
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"A lessor's acceptance of rent at the old
rate from a lessee continuing in possession
after expiration of the original term does
not create a renewal, but merely a tenancy
from month to month, where the original lease
giving the lessee an option to renew also gave
the lessor the right to demand an increased
rental, which the lessor had made a condition
of renewal, offering at the same time to permit the lessee to continue to occupy from
month to month at the old rental."
In further support of the Appellants contention
that the Court erred in its determination of this
issue as a matter of law, it is and was at that time,
Appellants contention that negotiations were being
carried on regarding the rate of payment for the
next term of the lease, (See Marvin C. Young Deposition, page 25, lines 12-21, and George E. Bridwell
Deposition, page 11, lines 8-21, and Alan D. Frandsen Deposition, page 1, lines 10-30 and page 15,
lines 1-18) and had the Court acted properly, allowing this matter to be determined factually, rather
than ruling as a matter of law, this evidence could
have been presented to the Court for its determination, for it is uniformly held that where a tenant
remains in possession of realty after the expiration
of his term and during a period in which he and
the landlord are negotiating for a new lease, and
the landlord accepts rents for this period, such acceptance is not a manifestation of the landlord's
consent to an extension or renewal of the lease. 45
ALR 2d, 841. In the case of Southern Railroad Company v. Peple 228 F. 853, the Court, although acknowledging that continuance in possession by a
renant with the payment of rent is usually regarded
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as a renewal of the lease, said that this rule does
not apply when the possession is retained and rent
paid pending negotiations with respect to the renewal of the lease.
CONCLUSION
It is submitted that this case should be reversed
and remanded for trial on its merits. A jury should
be allowed to determine whether the Respondent
breached his contract in allowing, without the consent of the Appellants, another attorney to handle
the case. Appellants believe the results of the original case would have been different on appeal and
therefore a jury should also be allowed to determine
whether or not the Respondent notified the appellants of their right of appeal. This case should therefore be reversed and remanded for trial and Appellants awarded their costs of appeal.

Respectfully submitted,
STEWART, TOPHAM &
HARDING
Attorneys at Law
RAY M. HARDING
Attorneys for
Appellants

